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Abstract
Exogeneous disruptions in labor demand have become more frequent in recent times. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in millions of workers being repeatedly laid 
off and rehired according to local public health conditions. This may be bad news for 
market efficiency. Typical employment relations—which resemble non-enforceable 
(implicit) contracts—rely on reciprocity (Brown et al. in Econometrica 72:747–780, 
2004), and hence could be harmed when workers’ efforts no longer guarantee reem-
ployment in the next period. In this paper we extend the BFF paradigm to include a 
per-period probability (0%, 10%, 50%) of publicly observable “shutdown”, where a 
specific firm cannot contract with any workers for several periods. A Perfect Bayes-
ian Equilibrium exists in which these shutdowns destabilize relationships, but do 
not harm efficiency. Our experiment shows that, remarkably, market efficiency can 
be maintained even with very frequent stochastic shutdowns. However, the dynamic 
of relational contracts changes from one where a worker finds stable employment to 
one where she juggles multiple employers, laying the burden of maintaining produc-
tivity upon workers and worsening worker-side inequality.
Keywords Relational contracts · Gift exchange · Labor markets · Unemployment · 
Shocks · Layoffs · Recession · Repeated game
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1 Introduction
Disruptions in labor demand often occur in everyday labor markets. This is a more 
common experience for workers in certain sectors with high failure rates or season-
ality of consumer demand (e.g. hospitality, entertainment, service, and high-tech 
start-ups). However, the recent coronavirus pandemic has resulted in temporary 
unemployment for about 25 million workers—affecting workers across the economy, 
including those employed in typically stable sectors.1 These disruptions are likely to 
continue into the future as many conditions for reopening require businesses to shut 
down when local public health conditions (e.g. infection and testing rates) do not 
remain below government requirements.2 More generally, firm-worker relationships 
can be interrupted by many exogenous reasons such as business cycle effects, liquid-
ity shocks, or changes in upper management’s priorities.3
Employment relations are tricky to navigate even without exogenous disruptions. 
Typical employment contracts specify the duration and terms of employment only 
loosely, leaving many details implicit (Williamson et al. 1975; Chevalier and Elli-
son 1997).4 In theory, since third parties cannot enforce implicit contracts, such 
contracts may be inefficient due to moral hazard. That is, after contracts are agreed 
upon, each party could take actions that undermine efficiency but which cannot be 
fully anticipated and contracted around. However, experimental evidence, such as 
from Brown et  al. (2004) (BFF), has shown that high efficiency can be achieved 
under incomplete contracts through relational contracts—informal long-term rela-
tionships with no explicit guarantee of relationship continuation. These contracts are 
driven by reciprocity: firms offer high wages to specific workers, workers reward 
these firms with high effort, and the firms return the favor with immediate contract 
renewals. Mirroring naturally-occurring labor markets, this high-tier market often 
coexists with a low-tier market of “McJobs” in which firms make public (indiscrimi-
nate) low wage offers and workers who accept those jobs deliver low effort.5
Intuitively, stochastic disruptions can undermine relational contracts in many 
ways. Workers who are uncertain about the stability of their jobs may not find it 
worthwhile to invest effort to maintain goodwill, and shirk. Firms may lower wages 
in anticipation of such defensive shirking, resulting in lower market efficiency.6 But 
1 See https ://tinyu rl.com/iloco ronav irus for global estimates. Cajner et al. (2020) find a 22% contraction 
in U.S. private-sector employment between mid-February and mid-April.
2 For example: https ://www.fox10 phoen ix.com/news/phoen ix-area-resta urant s-closi ng-again -due-to-
posit ive-covid -19-tests 1.
3 In developing countries, weak legal enforcement and limited capital markets subject firms to exagger-
ated shocks, which in turn affect their contractors (Banerjee and Duflo 2000).
4 Most US firms use “employment at will” clauses, which state that either the firm or the worker can ter-
minate an employment contract of indefinite duration at any time, for any reason. This clause renders the 
terms under which termination occurs vague and hence implicit in nature.
5 For the coexistence of well-paid permanent workers with poorly paid temporary workers in naturally 
occurring labor markets see Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) on Spain; Herrera and Shady (2005) on Peru; and 
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) on “insider–outsider” theory.
6 In relational contracts experiments, there are always high and low equilibria. Experiments in other 
domains with multiple equilibria have shown that exogenous random re-matching of agents can under-
mine efficiency (Camerer 2003, Chapter 7; Van Huyck et al. 1990, 1991; Anderson et al. 2001; Andreoni 
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these shocks can conceivably improve market efficiency. Azariadis (1975) and Rute 
Cardoso and Portela (2009) argue that firms will provide workers with de facto 
unemployment insurance in the event of stochastic shocks (such as more generous 
wages), thus inducing positive reciprocity from the workers. Lazear et  al. (2016) 
traced increased productivity during the recent 2008 recessions to incumbent work-
ers working harder as their local unemployment rate rises, an effect they termed 
“making do with less.” Putting this in the context of relational contracts, stochas-
tic shocks may increase workers’ anxiety over relationship continuation, driving 
workers to put in extra effort to keep their jobs or to improve their chances of being 
rehired in case of layoffs. Stochastic shutdowns may also improve market efficiency 
by accelerating productivity-enhancing reallocation (the “cleansing” effect of reces-
sion (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992)). However, Barlevy (2002) argues that as much 
as recession speeds the destruction of less efficient matches, it also slows the forma-
tion of the most efficient matches.
Laboratory experiments provide a useful first step to investigate the impact of 
temporal labor demand shocks on relational contracts. Unlike in naturally-occurring 
labor markets, complicating factors (such as uncertainty about the length or prob-
ability of shutdown, informal promises to rehire workers, or benefits offered to laid-
off workers) can be controlled in the lab. Additionally, shocks that are truly inde-
pendent and evidently exogenous can be easily created in the lab, allowing us to 
study relationship shocks in the simplest setting.7 Our experiment extends the BFF 
gift-exchange paradigm as follows: in every period, there is a probability that a firm 
experiences a publicly observable stochastic shock, which forces a three-period 
shutdown. The firm can observe the market during the shutdown, but is unable to 
contract with any workers. We employ three treatments: No Shutdowns, Infrequent 
(shutdowns), and Frequent (shutdowns).8
We develop a theory that follows previous literature in assuming the existence of 
some known proportions of fair (non-shirking) workers and selfish workers (cf. BFF 
and Bernard et al. 2018). We show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in 
which stochastic disruptions introduce instability in relationships, but the high wage-
effort equilibrium can persist despite frequent firm shutdowns. The intuitive idea is 
that both firms and workers prefer to contract with their incumbent partners,9 but 
workers temporarily laid off by a shutdown will accept offers from non-incumbent 
firms, put in high effort, and treat the new employer as its incumbent firm if rehired. 
7 As opposed to recessions, where shocks are correlated.
8 Three other experimental papers also feature stochastic outcomes in a relational contract setup. Fehr 
and Zehnder (2009) incorporated shocks in the borrowers’ ability to pay back loans in a credit market, 
Renner and Tyran (2004) experimented on one-time shocks to firms’ production costs, and Bartling et al. 
(2018) extended the BFF setting to one where productivity is a noisy function of worker effort. As far as 
we know, we are the first to test the impact of direct shocks on the trading partner’s ability to contract.
9 In other words, their latest contracting partner.
1988; Croson 1996; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997) suggesting that these temporary shutdowns could hurt 
the market if they result in random firm-worker rematching.
Footnote 6 (continued)
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Because laid-off workers are seen as unemployed through no fault of their own,10 
they are desirable to unmatched firms who poach these workers during shutdowns, 
leaving previously matched firms in need of new workers.11 This creates opportuni-
ties to build new relational contracts much later in the experimental periods than in 
markets without shutdowns.12
Our experiment finds that exogenous shutdowns destabilize matches, but, remark-
ably, high efficiency is maintained as firms and workers adapt their strategies. In 
our benchmark No Shutdowns condition, our results replicate BFF’s findings: firms 
quickly become matched with workers and then rely on immediately renewing offers 
to the same workers as long as they did not shirk. However, as shutdowns increase 
in frequency, renewals between incumbent firm-worker pairs went down from 61% 
of market activity (No Shutdowns) to 47% (Frequent), while contracts between new 
pairs went up from 17 to 36%. In spite of this instability, market efficiency is main-
tained across treatments with the exception of the last few periods. We see evidence 
that one firm’s misfortune is another firm’s opportunity: a worker is more likely to 
receive a private job offer from a new firm when his incumbent firm is temporarily 
shut down.13 Instead of treating these new offers as temporary side gigs, workers 
work just as hard (if not harder) for their wages indicating their desire to make a 
good impression. Aware of these fluid loyalties, firms returning after shutdowns are 
less likely to recall previous workers that have been actively working for others. This 
leads to relational instability without loss of market efficiency.
Overall, we see that relational contracts are robust to stochastic disruptions. 
Underneath it is a remarkable adaptability of firms and workers, who, given enough 
freedom, appear to reliably invent new strategies and norms that allow business to 
proceed even in the most difficult environments.14 Consistent with Davis and Halti-
wanger’s (1992) ’cleansing’ effect, the shock destroyed many inefficient matches 
while leaving efficient matches mostly unharmed. While contracts between high-
earning workers and high-earning firms were similar across treatments, contracts 
between low-earning pairs were replaced by interactions between high-earners 
and low-earners. Overall, these disruptions have significant welfare effects. Work-
ers cede more of their share of the trade surplus to firms (from 56 to 47%), and 
14 Adaptability appears to be a key factor in the robustness of relational contracts. Bernard et al. (2018) 
found that efficiency suffered when restrictions (such as fixed-partner and pay cut restrictions) were 
introduced, suggesting that free sorting /matching is key. Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015)’s empirical 
study of Kenyan rose growers and foreign-cut rose buyers find that relational contracts adapt to accom-
modate (localized and exogenous) supply chain disruptions due to ethnic violence.
10 A similar effect occurs in volunteering, in which stochastic shutdowns provide an excuse for volun-
teers to quit without shame (Linardi and McConnell 2011).
11 A recent survey found that about 25% of furloughed workers, and about 67% of laid-off restaurant 
workers are not expected to return to their former employer if given an opportunity (see https ://www.
qsrma gazin e.com/emplo yee-manag ement /will-emplo yees-actua lly-retur n-resta urant s).
12 This may be related to the ’restart’ effect in public goods experiments, where contributions that had 
decreased to a low level jumped back up when the game was unexpectedly restarted (Andreoni 1988; 
Andreoni and Croson 2008; Chaudhuri 2018).
13 We see no increase in the likelihood of a public offer, suggesting that this is targeted—not indiscrimi-
nate—recruitment.
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within-worker inequality grew. This echoes Lazear et al.’s (2016) and Cajner et al.’s 
(2020) findings: workers, particularly those that can least afford to take a hit, are 
those who suffer most when shocks hit real-life labor markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect.  2 we provide a theoretical 
model of the impact of stochastic shutdowns on contracting, with implications that 
are later tested by data from the experiments. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design. Section 4 discusses results. Section 5 is a short conclusion.
2  Theoretical model
In this gift exchange game let [w, ẽ] denote the wage w ∈ [0, 100] and desired effort 
level ẽ ∈ [1, 10] in a contract offered by an employer.15 A worker who accepts the 
contract then chooses an actual effort level e ∈ [1, 10] with effort cost function c(e). 
Unemployed workers receive unemployment pay of 5.
The monetary payoff of an employer is:
The monetary payoff to the worker is:
Let ŵ(ẽ) = [10ẽ + c(ẽ)]∕2 denote a fair wage offer −− one that offers an equal (or 
better) split of surplus. For desired effort ẽ and cost function c(e), the corresponding 
schedule of fair wages is given below: 
ẽ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
ŵ(ẽ) 5 10.5 16 22 28 34 40 46 52.5 59
Let there be two types of workers, selfish workers and fair workers. A worker 
is fair with probability p ∈ (0, 1) . Utility of a selfish worker is just his monetary 
payoff:
The utility of a fair worker offered a contract of (w, ẽ) and delivering e is:
(w, e) =
{




w − c(e) if the offer is accepted
5 otherwise
u(w, e) = v(w, e)
u(w, e) =
{
v(w, e) w < ŵ(ẽ)
v(w, e) − b ⋅ max(ẽ − e, 0) w ≥ ŵ(ẽ)
15 In this paper we will use the term employer and firm interchangeably.
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where disutility b of not fulfilling a fair contract is assumed to be high enough 
such that a fair worker will always provide the requested effort if he accepts a fair 
contract.
We start by considering a one-period version of the game with F ≥ 2 firms and 
W > F workers. Firms can post offers of (w, e) publicly or send it privately to a par-
ticular worker. A worker can only accept one offer per period: his employment status 
is displayed publicly so firms do not waste offers on workers that cannot accept it.
Let p denote the fraction of workers who are fair. We show that if p is high 
enough, there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where firms will offer a fair contract 
for non-minimal effort levels and fair workers will not deliver effort below what is 
requested (i.e shirk).
Proposition 1 The following is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: firms will send 
public offers of ŵ(ẽ) where the level of effort that can be achieved in the market, 
ẽ , depends on p according to the schedule below. Fair workers will perform e = ẽ 
while selfish workers perform e = 1.
Extending the intuition to a game of T periods (without shutdowns), let us make 
several assumptions. There exists at least the minimum proportion of fair types nec-
essary to sustain non-minimum effort, which by Proposition  1 is p = 0.55 . Firms 
think all workers that shirk are selfish types, and will either not hire them or offer 
only a minimum contract (5,  1). Both sides of the market prefer to contract with 
incumbents: all else equal, a worker at period t prefers to accept a contract renewal 
with his firm from t − 1 and an firm at period t prefers to rehire her worker from 
period t − 1.
Letting Vt be the cumulative future payoff of a worker that does not shirk at period 
t and V ′
t
 be the one for workers that shirk at t, the equilibrium effort level is the maxi-
mum ẽt that solves:
By Proposition 1, for p = 0.55 , ẽT = 2 , which means that VT−1 = 10.5 , the fair wage 
for ẽT = 2 , and V
�
t
= 5 , the wage offered to selfish types. Because c( ̃eT−1) ≤ 5.5 , 
̃eT−1 = 4 . Continuing the process we arrive at ẽt = 10 for all t < T − 1.
In this Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, at t = 1 all F firms will send identical pub-
lic offers of (59, 10) which will be accepted by F < W workers. Because workers 
that shirk are treated as selfish types, in equilibrium there is no shirking until the 
last period. This not only supports high effort levels until T − 1 , but also maintains 
matches made in the first period, resulting in permanent unemployment of W − F 
workers. BFF’s experimental evidence, while not as stark as their theoretical predic-
tion, indeed shows the market segmenting early into a high-tier market (high-wage 
contracts, high effort, and long-term relationships) and a low-tier market (low-wage 
p < 0.55 ẽ = 1
0.55 ≤ p < 0.6 ẽ = 2
0.6 ≤ p < 0.65 3 ≤ ẽ ≤ 8
p ≥ 0.65 8 ≤ ẽ ≤ 10
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contracts, low effort, and short-term relationships), with few opportunities to transi-
tion between the two markets.
What would happen to this disciplining mechanism in a market with stochas-
tic disruptions? Consider the case where with probability  , a firm experiences a 
publicly observable shutdown where they cannot hire for k > 0 periods. Here, firms 
will enter the labor market in a staggered manner. Once they start hiring, they have 
to temporarily lay off workers when a shutdown is exogenously imposed. Workers 
that are laid off during these local public disruptions—similar to workers who were 
never employed—are not labeled as shirkers, and hence are recruited by firms that 
still need workers. By the time incumbent firms are back in operation, they may 
have to start over in the labor market, thus continuing the cycle of instability in firm-
worker pairings.
We now show that there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the high-
effort equilibrium can be achieved even with the aforementioned instability in firm-
worker pairing (Proposition  3). To do that, we first derive the probability that an 
available worker—a worker who does not have an incumbent employer in the labor 
market—gets an offer from another firm, rt (Proposition  2). This probability is a 
function of the four conditions firms can be in at any period t: shut down (not hir-
ing), hiring for the first time ( Firstt ), operating normally ( Renewt ), or returning to 
operations after a shutdown ( Returnt).16
Proposition 2 The probability that an available worker gets an offer from a non-
incumbent firm at period t is a function of disruption probability  and can be recur-
sively determined by:
where
In the case of a one-period shock k = 1 , rt simplifies to:
Proposition 3 The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium in which both fair and selfish workers perform requested effort in the 
table below in all non-final periods.
(2)rt =
(Returntrt−1 + Firstt)F





(1 − )(t−1 + ( − t−1)rt−1)F
W − (1 − )(1 −  + ( − t−1)(1 − rt−1))F
16 In the case of a one-period shutdown, these four probabilities are  (firm is inactive now), 
First
t
= t−1(1 − ) (firm experienced t − 1 shocks), Renew
t
= (1 − )2 (firm was in market at t − 1 and 
t), and Return
t




−  = (1 − )( − t−1) (firm was shut down in t − 1 but not in t − 2 
and t).
 S. Linardi, C. Camerer 
1 3
t ≤ T − 5 T − 4 T − 3 T − 2 T − 1 T
ẽ for  = 0 10 10 10 10 4 2
ẽ for  = 0.1 10 10 10 9 4 2
ẽ for  = 0.5 10 9 6 4 3 2
• At period T, active firms offer a contract according to the schedule in Proposi-
tion 1. Fair workers perform e = ẽ while selfish workers shirk (perform e = 1).
• At period t < T  , an active employer offers her incumbent worker ŵ(ẽt) that sat-
isfies Eq. 1 if the worker has neither shirked nor contracted with another firm 
at t − 1 . If her incumbent worker has shirked or is no longer available, the firm 
offers the same contract to another available worker (workers with no incumbent 
employer in the market). If there are no available workers left, the firm offers 
(5, 1) to any worker.
• At period t < T  , a worker with an incumbent firm accepts a contract renewal, 
performs requested effort with probability 1 −  and is laid off due to his firm’s 
shutdown with probability  . A laid-off worker receives and accepts an identical 
offer from another firm with probability rt and from that point forward considers 
the new firm the incumbent employer.
• At period t = 1 , (1 − )F firms make public offers of ŵ(10) . Workers unmatched 
at t = 1 become employed at period t with probability rt.
• Off-equilibrium beliefs: Firms assume all workers that shirk are selfish types. 
Firms also assume that a worker who accepts a non-incumbent firm’s offer when 
his incumbent employer is in the labor market must have shirked. If there are no 
ẽt that satisfy the condition such that selfish types do not shirk, firms behave as if 
they are in a one period game.
The four sub-figures in Fig.  1 below provide simulation results illustrating the 
dynamics of new employment opportunities ( rt , Eq.  2, left panel) and effort level 
at the last six periods ( ̃et , Proposition  3, right panel).17 We use our experimental 
setting of nine firms and ten workers in this simulation. The top panel illustrates 
the effect of shutdowns lasting one period ( k = 1 ) while the bottom panel illustrates 
shutdowns that last three periods ( k = 3 ), which we will use for the experiment. As 
the probability and length of shutdowns increases, two things happen: the window 
of opportunity for new relational contracts is extended into later periods, and the 
high-effort equilibrium unravels earlier.
Testable implications
Together, the propositions and the simulation results allow us to predict how 
firms and workers will adapt relational contracts such that high efficiency is possible 
even with exogenous, stochastic shutdowns. We summarize our predictions below 
and test them in the experiment described in the next section.
17 Effort can be sustained at the maximum (10) in all t ≤ T − 5 for the range of parameters used in the 
simulation.
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We will run two models. We will use Eq. 3 to get a big picture of treatment effects. 
The first two variables are the treatment (frequency of shutdowns j ) and period 
marker. Last5tj is a binary variable that is 1 for the last 5 periods ( 25 < t ≤ 30 ); 
Last5 ⋅ tj is the interaction with the frequency of shutdowns. We will then use Eq. 4 
for more detailed exploration of time trends and the role of shutdowns. In Eq.  4 
IsShutdownitj is a binary variable that is 1 if worker i’s incumbent employer is shut 
down in period t. Xitj is a shorthand for control variables, which includes all the vari-
ables in Eq. 3 ( j , Last5tj , Last5 ⋅ tj ) as well as additional controls.
 
1. Frequent shutdowns cause instability in relationships: As  increases, the frac-
tion of contracts with incumbent employers will decrease while the fraction of 
contracts with new employers will increase.
 Let Incumbentitj be a binary variable that indicates that worker i in period t in 
session j contracted with an incumbent and Newitj be a similar variable indi-
cating a contract with a new employer. Running the regression in Eq. 3 with 
Yitj = Incumbentitj we predict that b1 < 0 . Conversely, when Yitj = Newitj , b1 > 0.
2. With the exception of the last few periods, market efficiency is unharmed: Accord-
ing to Proposition 3, though the market unravels earlier, market efficiency (prox-
ied by workers’ effort)18 and the wages supporting it will be the same across 
treatments.
 Let Effortitj be the effort level delivered by worker i in period t in session j and 
Wageitj be the corresponding wage. When we regress Effortitj on Eq. 3, we predict 
b1 = 0 while b4 < 0 . The same is predicted for Wageitj.
3. Shutdowns prolong invitations to start new relational contracts: As shown in the 
left panel of Fig. 1, the probability that a worker gets an offer from a new firm 
decreases with time, disciplining workers against shirking. However, as temporary 
shutdowns become more frequent, this decline becomes less pronounced.
 Let NewOfferitj be a binary variable that is 1 if worker i receive a private offer 
from a new firm at period t. When we regress NewOfferitj on Eq. 4, b1 < 0 and 
b2 > 0.
4. Shutdowns provide direct opportunities for poaching: Workers are assumed to 
prefer their incumbent firm, and hence are seen as more available during their 
firms’ shutdown. Therefore, when we regress NewOfferitj on Eq. 4, we expect b3 
to be positive.
(3)Yitj = a + b1j + b2Periodtj + b3Last5tj + b4Last5 ⋅ tj
(4)Yitj = a + b1Periodtj + b2Period ⋅ tj + b3IsShutdownitj + Xitj







= 10 . Since surplus is a function of effort only, effort in itself 
is a sufficient proxy for efficiency.
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 Similarly, a worker is less likely to be rehired by his former employer after a shut-
down if he has been employed elsewhere extensively in the meantime. Looking 
only at periods where a worker’s incumbent firm is returning from a shutdown, let 
Rehireitj be a binary variable that is 1 if worker i’s returning employer sends him a 
private offer and #Contractsitj be the number of periods i worked for another firm 
during the shutdown. Regressing the former against the latter (Eq. 4), we predict 
the coefficient on #Contractsitj will be negative.
5. Contracts during shutdowns are not “McJobs” but attempts at longer term rela-
tional contracts: Poaching firms make fair, high wage offers to laid-off workers 
and laid-off workers do not shirk. Regressing Wageitj against Eq. 4, we predict 
b3 = 0 . The same is predicted for Effortitj.
3  Experimental design
All sessions consist of nine firms and ten workers who traded for 30 periods.19 We 
utilize a large number of firms and workers in order to have enough firms to contract 
during periods of shutdowns. We implemented three treatments to test the robust-
ness of relational contracts to exogenous, stochastic disruption: No Shutdowns, our 
baseline treatment where there are no exogenous disruptions (  = 0 ); Infrequent 
shutdowns where in each period, a firm may be forced to shut down operations for 
Top le: rt for k=1. Top right: et for k=1.
Boom le: rt for k=3. Boom right: et for k=3




 for k = 1 and 3 and  = 0 to 0.7 
19 Except for one  = 0.5 session where we had eighteen subjects and hence ran with nine firms and nine 
workers. While there is little power to test whether this session produced different results than the other 
four, there are no substantive differences so all sessions were pooled in our analyses.
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three periods with probability  = 0.10 , and Frequent shutdowns where the prob-
ability of this firm-specific shock is 0.50. The length and probability of shutdowns 
are common knowledge among all subjects.
Our No Shutdowns sessions are a replication of BFF’s incomplete contract con-
dition with reputation formation. This is a finitely repeated game where firms and 
workers are assigned a fixed identification number that will persist for the entire 
game. All workers’ employment information is publicly available to all firms for 
each period. Firms make contract offers, specifying wages ( wt ) and desired effort 
level ( ̃et ). A firm can offer the same contracts to all workers simultaneously using a 
publicly posted offer, which is observable to everyone in the market (including other 
employers). A firm can also address her offer to a specific worker using private con-
tracts sent to the worker’s ID.20
A firm can make as many offers as she desires, but can only contract with one 
worker in each period. A worker cannot make offers, but instead choose from a list-
ing of all public offers and the private offers addressed to him. A worker can only 
accept one contract per period.21 After accepting a contract, the worker is publicly 
shown to be no longer available for hire. He then chooses the effort level he wants 
to deliver ( et ), which does not have to abide by the effort level requested by the 
employer due to lack of third-party enforcement. The cost of effort and payoffs for 
both employers and workers, which follows the theoretical model in the previous 
section, are then displayed to both parties.22
Our Infrequent and Frequent shutdown treatments modeled idiosyncratic 
employer-specific shocks that exogenously interrupt relationships.23 As is often the 
case in the real world, the identities of the firms who are forced to shut down in the 
current round are public knowledge to all firms and workers. This has the additional 
benefit of eliminating a firm’s strategic misreporting of her status. An inactive firm 
cannot make any offers (and hence has to “lay off” her incumbent worker), but is 
still able to observe the market and is therefore aware of other firms’ public offers 
and of all workers’ employment statuses.
We chose to implement a three-period shutdown ( k = 3).24 This duration is short 
enough to have a small effect on payoffs, but long enough that a laid-off worker and 
his new employer (assuming he finds one) may develop a new relationship. For ana-
lytical tractability, we have modeled only the k = 1 case in the theoretical section, 
but as illustrated by the simulation in Fig. 1, the k = 3 case is qualitatively similar.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software, based 
on BFF’s original software. Figs. A1−3 in the “Appendix” in ESM provides a graph-
ical timeline of the experiment using screenshots. Before the game started, subjects 
20 A screenshot of the firm’s contracting screen can be seen in Fig. A1 in the “Appendix” in ESM.
21 The worker’s screen can be seen in Fig. A2 in the “Appendix” in ESM.
22 The outcome screen can be seen in Fig. A3 in the “Appendix” in ESM.
23 https ://www.cbsne ws.com/news/coron aviru s-resta urant s-again -shutt ing-their -doors -as-coron aviru 
s-flare s/. Note, however, that larger outbreaks may be better proxied by correlated shocks, which is out-
side of the scope of this paper.
24 We employ thirty periods so that firms still have substantial time to contract even with a three-period 
shutdown duration.
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were given a quiz to ensure their understanding of the game and the payoffs to firms 
and workers. Each session lasted approximately 100 min and subjects earned, on 
average, $35. We conducted 5 sessions of each treatment at the University of Pitts-
burgh. In the “Appendix” in ESM we include data from pilot experiments at the Cal-
ifornia Institute of Technology (Caltech) where subjects have substantial laboratory 
experience, and at University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA) which is repre-
sentative of a more typical large-university student population. The Caltech sessions 
provide a comparison of  = 0 and  = 0.05 , while the UCLA sessions include  = 0 
and  = 0.1
4  Results
Our results section is organized as follows: Table 1 reports summary statistics at the 
session level with each session contributing one data point. We use two-sided Wil-
coxon rank sum tests to test differences across treatments. Figure 2 plots the empiri-
cal time series of private offers from new firms ( rt ) and effort levels ( et ) that were 
simulated in Fig. 1 (bottom panel, k = 3 ). Tables 2, 3 and 4 present regressions test-
ing the five testable implications from the theoretical model. Table 2 tests Hypoth-
eses 1 and 2, Table 3 tests Hypotheses 3 and 4, while Table 4 tests Hypothesis 5. We 
use bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the session level for all regressions.
Table  1 shows the main features of the market. Contracts feature wage offers 
averaging 34.42–39.41, requested effort between 7.14–7.61, and delivered effort 
about one unit lower than the requested effort (6.21–6.64).25 Average wages are a 
little lower than the fair wages for the requested effort levels, but the actual effort 
delivered by workers generates a more equitable surplus. None of the differences 
were significant using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, suggesting that market 
efficiency was preserved.
Differences begin to emerge as we look closer at the nature of the contracts. Pub-
lic wage offers and firms’ propensity for private offers over public offers were simi-
lar across all treatments, but private wage offers were significantly lower in the Fre-
quent treatment compared to the other two treatments (37.38 vs. 46.80 and 45.30, 
p < 0.01 ). This may be due to the identity of the contracting partners. Compared 
to the No Shutdowns sessions, the Frequent sessions had fewer contracts between 
an employer and her incumbent worker26 (61% vs. 47%, p < 0.10 ) and more con-
tracts between new partners (17% vs. 36%, p < 0.01)). The proportion of contracts 
between an employer and past workers was not affected by shutdown frequency.
This instability changes the nature of matching between firms and workers. In 
the No Shutdowns sessions, low-earning firms contract mostly with low-earning 
25 Because effort is below the surplus-maximizing value of 10, market efficiency is around 66%.
26 As a reminder the incumbent worker refers to the worker that a firm had contracted with in her most 
recent period of market activity.
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workers (40%)27—the same is true for high-earning firms and workers (40%). How-
ever, in the Frequent shutdown treatment, contracts between low-earning firm-
worker pairs only make up 17% of the market, replaced with contracts between low 
earners and high earners (47%).28 The increase in disruption frequency seems to 
have what Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) refer to as the cleansing effect of reces-
sion—rematching inefficient firm-worker pairs without harming those in efficient 
matches (40% to 35%, p > 0.10).
Workers appear to bear more of the weight of these stochastic disruptions. The 
share of the total surplus that goes to workers is lower in the Frequent treatment 
(56%, compared to 47% in No Shutdowns, p < 0.01 ). This is in line with Lazear 
et al.’s (2016) study of the 2008 recession which shows that maintained productivity 
was driven by workers doing more with less. Like Cajner et al.’s (2020) study of the 
impact of coronavirus, we also see that those that can least afford to take a hit are 
most harmed. With Frequent shutdowns, the top 20% of workers increase their share 
of the total worker surplus from 43% to 55%. The frequency of shutdowns does not 
appear to affect firm-side inequality.
Some time trends can be seen in Fig. 2. The left panel shows that opportunities 
to form new relational contracts—in the form of private offers from new firms—are 
mostly concentrated in the early periods in the No Shutdowns treatment, are shifted 
back several periods in the Infrequent shutdowns treatment, and finally are spread 
out throughout the periods with Frequent shutdowns. The right panel shows that 
delivered effort drifts up over time to a surprisingly similar degree across all treat-
ments, starting around 5 units and increasing to 7.5 and before dropping in the last 
five periods to 6.5 (in No Shutdowns) or 5 (in the other two treatments).
We will now use regression analysis to test the five predictions presented earlier. 
A total of 2872 contracts were executed between 135 firms and 149 workers in 15 
sessions of this 30-period game. Table 2 tests Prediction 1 and 2 with the regres-
sion in Eq. 3.  is rescaled such that 1 corresponds to our Frequent treatment (where 
per-period probability of shutdown is 0.5).29 Period is also rescaled so that each unit 
corresponds to 10 periods.
As hypothesized in Prediction 1, we find that the coefficient for  is negative for 
Column 1 and positive in Column 2. As shutdown frequency goes from 0 to 0.5, 
workers are 13.8% ( p < 0.10 ) less likely to contract with an incumbent employer 
(note that we include firms returning from a shutdown here) and 32.3% more likely 
to contract with a completely new firm ( p < 0.01).
27 For each experimental session, we first rank the 10 workers’ earnings against each other, and then 
do the same for firms. We then calculate the number of times workers who are ranked in the top 50% 
worked with firms who are in the top 50%.
28 Specifically, 36% of market contracts were from high earning workers contracting with low earning 
firms and 11% from low earning workers contracting with high earning firms. These percentages were 
15% and 5%, respectively, for the No Shutdown treatment.
29 Probability of shutdown in the Infrequent treatment is 0.1.
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Table 1  Summary statistics
Wilcoxon test of treatment differences from  = 0








downs  = 0.50
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Market statistics
Wages offered by firms 38.99 1.96 39.41 2.59 34.42 3.72
Effort requested by firms 7.69 0.13 7.92 0.31 7.47 0.47
Effort delivered by workers 6.21 0.24 6.64 0.40 6.25 0.64
Wages by offer types
Wages in public contracts 24.25 3.87 24.92 1.67 25.49 4.18
Wages in private contracts 46.80 0.81 45.30 2.44 37.38*** 3.10
% private offer 0.64 0.05 0.71 0.03 0.68 0.09
Identity of employer in contracts
Worker’s incumbent employer 0.61 0.05 0.59 0.03 0.46* 0.06
Worker’s previous (but non-incumbent) employer 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.03
A completely new firm 0.17 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.36*** 0.03
Matching
Bottom 50% workers with bottom 50% firms 0.40 0.01 0.29** 0.02 0.18*** 0.05
Workers and firms from different tiers 0.20 0.03 0.34** 0.04 0.47** 0.09
Top 50% workers with top 50% firms 0.40 0.02 0.37 0.02 0.35 0.04
Welfare
Workers’ share of total surplus 0.56 0.01 0.52 0.02 0.47*** 0.01
Top 20% workers’ share of worker surplus 0.43 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.55*** 0.02
Top 20% firms’ share of firm surplus 0.38 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.38 0.05
Number of contracts 1323 1026 523
Number of worker-period (including unemployed periods) 1500 1500 1470
































Fig. 2  Empirical distribution of rt (left) and et (right) for k = 3 and  = 0–0.5. Note: Distribution was 
smoothed by binning per-period session averages over 2 periods
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Result 1: Frequent shutdowns cause instability in  relationships  Shutdowns do not 
merely postpone contracts between existing partners but makes them less likely to 
recur, necessitating the creation of new relationships.
Interestingly, this instability does not lead to market inefficiency. Column 3 shows 
that increasing disruption frequency did not lower delivered effort (0.187, p > 0.10 ) 
beyond the last few periods. Beyond the standard end game effect on delivered effort 
Last5Periods (− 1.081, p < 0.01 ), we see an additional drop in the interaction term 
Last5 ⋅  (− 0.993, p < 0.05 ) due to the earlier unraveling introduced by increasing 
 . Wages are slightly lower in the Frequent shutdowns sessions than in the No Shut-
downs sessions but the difference is not significant (Column 4).30 There are no addi-
tional drops in wages for the last five periods, suggesting that firms did not antici-
pate that the market would unravel earlier.
Result 2  Frequent shutdowns cause the market to unravel earlier, but do not other-
wise decrease market efficiency.
Before moving on to Result 3, we note that the coefficients on Period in Table 2 
provide some initial insight into the time trends in contracting. As the game pro-
gresses, workers are much more likely to contract with an incumbent firm (Column 
Table 2  Increased disruptions (  ) cause instability in contracting partners (Column 1 and 2) but does not 
decrease market efficiency (Column 3)
Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) in parentheses clustered at the session level (15 sessions)
 ***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Contracted with 
Incumbent employer = 1
Contracted with 
new firm = 1
Effort delivered Wage offered
 (per 0.50) − 0.138* 0.210*** 0.187 − 4.443
(0.071) (0.036) (0.712) (4.248)
Period (per 10) 0.273*** − 0.323*** 1.279*** 5.204***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.155) (0.997)
Last 5 Periods − 0.178*** 0.281*** − 1.081*** − 2.155**
(0.024) (0.017) (0.173) (0.917)
Last 5 ⋅  − 0.084 − 0.043 − 0.993** − 1.442
(0.056) (0.050) (0.413) (3.301)
Constant 0.219*** 0.629*** 4.569*** 31.837***
(0.037) (0.020) (0.376) (2.850)
Observations 2872 2872 2872 2872
R-squared 0.170 0.325 0.071 0.055
30 We see no evidence that firms provide de-facto unemployment insurance (Azariadis (1975), Rute Rute 
Cardoso and Portela (2009)) in this setting.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 S. Linardi, C. Camerer 
1 3
1, 0.273) and much less likely to continue experimenting with new firms (Column 
2, − 0.323). Every 10 periods of the game correspond to a 1.279 point increase in 
effort (Column 3) which is supported by a 5.204 raise in wages (Column 4).
Table 3 explores how shutdown frequency and the shutdowns themselves change 
the dynamics of work opportunities. To do this, we need to look at periods where 
workers did not work as well as those where they did. We therefore switch from 
using contracts as the unit of observation to worker-period (149 workers × 30 
period = 4470 worker-periods). Because the shutdown “knocks out” firms for sev-
eral periods, as in real-world labor market shocks, we include #ActiveFirms to con-
trol for the number of firms that are able to make offers.31
The coefficients in Period in Table 3 Column 1 shows that the probability that 
a player will get an offer from a new firm decreases by 8.1% ( p < 0.01 ) every 10 
periods in No Shutdowns.32 The evidence on whether  slows down the decline of 
new private offers is mixed. The coefficient on Period ⋅ j is not significant, but it is 
positive (5.3%, p > 0.10 ) and the linear combination of Period and Period ⋅ j is no 
longer significantly positive (2.8%, p > 0.10).
Result 3 There is no significant difference in the time trend of new private offers due 
to the frequency of shutdowns, however, the significant decline seen in the No Shut-
down treatment is smaller in magnitude and not significant in the Frequent shut-
down treatment..
Now let us look directly at the role of shutdowns. Our focus is the binary vari-
able IsShutDown (shown in Tables 3 and 4 as “Incumbent Employer is Shut Down”) 
which is 1 when the worker’s incumbent employer is forced to shut down. Column 
1 shows that workers are 3.3% more likely to get a private offer from new firms in 
each period of the shutdown ( p < 0.01) . Given that the average per-period prob-
ability that a worker receives a private offer from a new firm is only 9%, this is a 
substantial increase. It appears that firms notice suddenly-unemployed workers and 
try to “poach” them with new offers.33 Regressing the availability of public offers 
against IsShutDown in Column 2, we see that firms are not more likely to send indis-
criminate public offers during other firms’ shutdowns, confirming their intention to 
target specific workers. However, anxious workers without good private offers are 
more likely to accept whatever public offer is available (Column 3). As a result of 
this combination of firm poaching and laid off workers’ decreased selectivity, new 
matches are being formed during shutdowns (Column 4).
How does the incumbent employer react upon return to operations? Our model 
describes an equilibrium where all agents prefer to continue contracting with 
31 Demand for labor, i.e the ratio of firms to workers across all periods (after accounting for the shut-
downs), is 0.45 for  = 0.50 , 0.81 for  = 0.10 , and 0.90 for  = 0 . Brown et  al. found that relational 
contracts persist under different firm-worker ratios, even when there is excess demand for labor rather 
than excess supply of labor.
32 We see that availability of public offers (Column 2) and the probability that a worker will accept pub-
lic offers (Column 3) also decrease in time.
33 Recall that the experimental setup includes a screen where firms can see worker availability.
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whoever they contracted with last, supported by off-equilibrium beliefs that work-
ers that do not do so have shirked. This implies that a firm that is returning from a 
shutdown is reluctant to reconnect with workers who worked for other firms, since 
they are no longer the worker’s incumbent employer. The coefficient on #Contracts 
(shown in Table  3 as “Worker # of Contracts During Incumbent Employer Shut-
down”) in Column 5 indeed shows that for every contract the worker engages in dur-
ing the shutdown, his incumbent firm is 4.8% less likely to offer to rehire him upon 
her return to operation.
Result 4  Shutdown periods provide direct opportunities for poaching. Firms let go 
of poached workers.
Finally, Table 4 investigates the intention behind the demand and supply for labor 
of laid-off workers.34 We earlier hypothesized that as the frequency of shutdowns 
increases, the probability that firms become disconnected from incumbent workers 
increases, and with it, the need to build new relational contracts. Since layoffs are 
not related to performance, laid-off workers are not stigmatized as shirkers and are 
seen as potential long-term hires for these firms. This implies that wages offered to 
laid-off workers are likely to be fair, as opposed to the minimum wages offered to 
shirkers. Similarly, we hypothesize that laid-off workers are not just waiting for their 
incumbent employer to return and rehire them—instead, they are actively looking 
for new relational contracts. This implies that they will not treat the job as “temp-
ing” and instead will put in good effort in hopes that it will turn into something more 
long term.
Table 4 Column 1 shows that contrary to our hypothesis, wage offers to laid-off 
workers are actually 4.5 points lower ( p < 0.01 ) than wages to non-laid-off workers. 
Column 2 explains why: firms pay a significant wage premium to incumbent work-
ers (8.624), which is not offered to new hires by definition. After controlling for the 
incumbent premium, there are no longer any difference between wages offered to 
laid-off workers and wages offered to other workers.
We find the same phenomenon for effort. Without controlling for lower wages, 
we find that effort expended by laid-off workers is 0.5 lower than that of non-laid-off 
workers (Column 3), however, this difference disappears after controlling for lower 
wages (Column 4). In fact, laid-off workers actually work harder (Column 5) after 
controlling for the effect of incumbent matches on delivered effort. It turns out that 
workers, like firms, also provide a bonus to incumbents. After controlling for this, 
we find that workers are actually working harder with less when they are laid off, 
anxious to secure themselves another position.
Result 5: Shutdown periods are used to  explore new relational contracts  Poaching 
firms make fair, high wage offers and laid-off workers do not shirk.
34 Contracts involving laid off workers -i.e the workers left behind by their incumbent firms’ shutdown- 
make up 0%, 6%, 31% of market activity in, respectively, No Shutdowns, Infrequent, and Frequent treat-
ments.
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Figure 3 graphically illustrates how relational contracts adapt to stochastic dis-
ruptions.35 Each panel documents the contracting experience of a single worker. The 
x-axis marks the periods while the y-axis sorts the worker’s employers by his fre-
quency of contracts with that employer. For example, Employer 1 is the firm for 
whom the worker works in the most periods. We identify firms by their experimental 
subject ID number shown in the graph. For example, for the worker in the Top left 
panel’s Employer 1 is Firm 1901 and the worker works by far the most periods for 
that firm. Marker sizes indicate the effort delivered by the worker in that particular 
period. There are three types of markers: a hollow circle indicates a regular contract, 
a filled circle is a worker’s first contract during his incumbent employer’s shutdown, 
and a diamond shows that the worker is rehired after the incumbent firm recovers.
Without exogenous disruptions, firms and workers quickly settle in a single, con-
tinuous relational contract after a short period of experimentation. For example, the 
top left panel of Fig. 3 shows worker 1903 settling down with firm 1901 after trying 
out firm 1902 and 1909. This basic pattern of contracting changes very little with 
Infrequent shutdowns. Worker 1701 in the top right panel provides a typical exam-
ple. This worker settles down with firm 1707 early on and waits out shutdowns by 
taking low-paying, low-effort jobs (see small filled circles labeled with firm 1701 
and 1706). When firm 1707 returns to operation, the worker is rehired and their rela-
tionship continues as before (see large diamond followed by large hollow circles).
Frequent shutdowns, on the other hand, fundamentally change the pattern of rela-
tional contracts from one where a worker finds stable employment from one firm to 
one where he juggles multiple employers. The bottom row of Fig. 3 provides two 
examples. On the left we see a worker who gradually shifted away from his primary 
employer after a shutdown. Worker 3401 started with firm 3403, but worked exten-
sively for firm 3404 during firm 3403’s shutdown. He eventually put in high effort 
only for 3404 and shirked whenever hired by his former employer. The right panel 
depicts worker 3408 who balances three relational contracts at a time (with firms 
3402, 3405, and 3401). The worker ends up working with 5 firms in total, with a 
career path that resembles a freelancer rather than an employee.
5  Conclusion
These experiments explore the robustness of gift-exchange markets to a realistic 
kind of interruption. In these markets firms offer an enforceable wage and request 
unenforceable effort from workers. Effort is costly for workers and valuable for 
firms; surplus is created if workers accept jobs and choose to deliver high effort. 
Because the cost and benefits of wages net to zero, efficiency depends entirely on 
total worker effort.
Previous experiments have shown that efficiency can be quite high, especially 
when workers are identifiable and employers can repeatedly contract by making pri-
vate worker-specific offers. These are relational contracts because employers request 
35 The figures here show a sample of workers who are among the top 20% of earners in their session.
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effort but depend on the worker to deliver the appropriate level of effort and there is 
worker moral hazard because direct pay does not depend on effort alone.
The key experimental treatment we use is a change in the probability with which 
firms suffer a firm-specific three-period disruption and cannot hire workers. (The 
COVID-19 pandemic is a magnified example of this on a massive and worldwide 
scale.) Many other types of disruptions could be simulated through experimental 
design. The short-run disruptions to firms’ labor demand we study here is just a 
starting point for an experimental program of understanding robustness to various 
other kinds of shocks, especially the business-cycle effects of correlated shocks.
In earlier experiments, relational contracts typically form when an employer 
first hires a worker, then renews his contract privately if the worker does not shirk. 
Wages and effort increase and market-wide efficiency is high. Shutdowns pose a 
challenge to this efficient regime of relational contracting by exogenously breaking 
           Top le: Worker 1903 (No Shutdown).                        Top right: Worker 1701 (Infrequent). 
            Boom le: Worker 3401 (Frequent)   Boom right:  Worker 3408 (Frequent) 
Fig. 3  Workers’ contracting patterns across the three experimental treatments. Note: A hollow circle 
indicates a regular contract, a filled circle is a worker’s first contract during his incumbent’s shutdown, 
and a diamond shows that the worker is rehired after the incumbent firm recovers. Gaps between markers 
indicate worker was not employed in that period. Effort = size of marker . Employer numbers are sorted 
by frequency of contracts with worker. For example, Employer 1 is the employer for whom the worker 
works in the most periods. Employer number is the experimental subject ID number shown in the graph. 
For example, for the worker in the Top left panel’s Employer 1 is Firm 1901 and the worker works by far 
the most periods for that employer
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such contracts. In this paper we present a theory in which firms challenged by this 
downturn navigate through selfish, strategic workers, who co-exist with fair-minded 
ones (who always provide the requested level of effort), and manage to maintain 
high equilibrium. This model has several testable implications. General patterns in 
the data are consistent with these predictions. We see that shutdowns cause insta-
bility in the form of random rematching, but do not affect workers’ effort beyond 
the last few periods. We find that the shutdown periods provide a direct opportunity 
for firms to try out new workers, since laid-off workers are uncertain about being 
rehired by their incumbent firms and seek to make a good impression to other firms. 
We also observe that workers’ suffer more from these disruptions, which was not 
predicted by our model but is consistent with empirical research on recessions.
We conclude with several remarks. First, the statistical power to identify differ-
ences across  conditions is limited. As is well-known in experimental economics, 
the error structure in observations from individuals and periods in complicated mar-
kets are complicated to analyze (e.g. Fréchette 2012). A conservative way to treat 
these data is to use one experimental session as a single observation (see Table 1). 
Nonetheless, the main observations in these 15 sessions were also evident in a large 
number of sessions in two previous student subject pools.36
Second, it is always the case that these markets have “McJobs” equilibria in 
which firms’ expectation that all workers will completely shirk leads to the lowest 
profitable wage offer, which in turn leads to low efficiency. In this paper we present 
a theoretical model predicting minimal harm to market equilibrium. However, it is 
also quite possible that exogenous disruptions could inject enough strategic uncer-
tainty to undermine formation of relational contracts and market efficiency. Observ-
ing these markets achieve substantial efficiency taught us that these markets are 
surprisingly resilient to exogenous interruptions. The power of rematching of invol-
untarily-unemployed workers creates something closely akin to the “restart” effect 
in public goods experiments.
Finally, during the extreme condition with  = .5 , firms were often in downturns, 
creating involuntary unemployment among workers. As a result, a large number 
of subjects—both firms and workers—in those experimental sessions were visibly 
bored and not very happy. It has been known for a long time that unemployment is 
bad for mental health (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld 1938; Paul and Moser 2009) and 
causes a host of other negative social outcomes. Unemployment strongly reduces 
measured subjective well-being (Di Tella et al. 2001; Kahneman and Krueger 2006) 
and negative effects can be long-lasting (Lucas et  al. 2004). Similarly, success-
ful relational contracting between pairs of people may generate a sense of social 
closeness, camaraderie, and endogenous group affiliation or empathy (what Adam 
Smith called fellow-feeling). Observing our subjects’ reaction to this experimental 
labor market suggests that this paradigm could conceivably be used to study the 
36 These data are treated as pilots and reported only in an “Appendix” in ESM. Stochastic disruptions do 
not harm the high equilibrium (“Appendix” Table A1 in ESM), terminate the relationship of less optimal 
employer-worker pairs (“Appendix” Table A2 in ESM), and improve the short-term market (“Appendix” 
Figs. A5−8 in ESM).
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psychology and even consequences of such effects. Experimental observation of 
these psychological and emotional forces could be achieved by combining the usual 
observations of choice and effort with self-reports and biological measures. Such 
measures, combined with theory, could bring more scientific precision to concepts 
that are often relegated to areas of public health or organizational psychology and 
are important, but not present in most economic contracting models (cf. Brandts 
et al. 2014 on legitimacy).
Theoretical appendix
Proposition 1
Proof Since there are no future periods, 1 − p selfish workers would shirk no matter 
what wage is offered. Employers are restricted to fair wages ŵ(ẽ) if they want to get 
beyond minimum effort from the p fair workers. Since there is an excess supply of 
labor, employers can choose the most profit maximizing wages out of all possible 
ŵ(ẽ) . The employers’ problem is then to choose ẽ to maximize
Taking a derivative over ẽ and setting it to 0 after substituting the definition of w(ẽ) , 
we arrive at:
and hence an employer’s profit is maximized when c�(ẽ) = 20p − 10 , which implies 
employer should offer ŵ(ẽ) with any ẽ that satisfy the condition above. Solving this 
for the menu of effort costs, we arrive at c�(ẽ) = 1 when p = 0.55 , c�(ẽ) = 2 when 
p = 0.60 , and c�(ẽ) = 3 when p ≥ 0.65 .   ◻
Proposition 2
Proof First consider the number of employers that will make offers to non-incum-
bent workers. FirsttF employers will make such offers since they have not yet con-
tracted with any workers. In addition, the ReturntF employers will be reentering the 
market at period t. The probability that their workers has switched employers in their 
absence is rt−1 , resulting in Returntrt−1F unmatched employers.
Now consider the number of workers that will be targeted for these offers. 
Employers will avoid the RenewtF workers that have incumbent employers from 
period t − 1 since these pairs will reconnect unless these workers have shirked. 
Returnt(1 − rt−1)F other workers will receive reconnection offers from returning 




𝜋(ẽ) = 10(pẽ + (1 − p)1) − w(ẽ)
𝜕𝜋
𝜕ẽ
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The chance that any available worker will receive an offer is therefore the 
number of offers divided by the number of available workers. Substituting 
Firstt = 
t−1(1 − ) , Renewt = (1 − )2 , and Renewt = (1 − )( − t−1) and simpli-




• Step 0 Period t = T  . The market proceed as in the one period market in Proposi-
tion 1.
• Step 1 (Behavior of fair workers at t < T)
 Fair workers will provide the requested effort regardless of whether the hiring 
employer is an incumbent employer or a new employer since in equilibrium all 
employers will only offer fair wages.
• Step 2 (Behavior of selfish workers at t = T − 1)
 At period T − 1 selfish workers who receive an offer of ŵ( ̃eT−1) decides whether 
or not to shirk. A worker that does not shirk will need to bear the cost of effort 
this period, earning ŵ( ̃eT−1) − c( ̃eT−1) and will find himself in one of three situa-
tion at the last period:
– With probability 1 −  , he will be offered ŵ(ẽT ) at the last period (T) by his 
incumbent employer.
– With probability rT , his employer will be out of the labor market but he will 
receive an offer of ŵ(ẽT ) from a new employer. (Proposition 2)
– With probability (1 − rT ) , his employer will be out of the labor market and 
he does not receive an offer from a new employer and earn the unemployment 
pay of 5.
 Therefore the expected future payoff for workers for not shirking in period 
T − 1 is: 
 A worker that shirk at T − 1 does not put in any costly effort and gains the full 
ŵ( ̃eT−1) . At period T he will find himself in one of the following situations:
– With probability  , his firm cannot hire due to an interruption, hence covering 
up his shirking. With probability rT another firm will offer him ŵ(ẽT ) and with 
probability 1 − rT he earn only the unemployment pay of 5.
rt =
(1 − )(t−1 + ( − t−1)rt−1)F
W − (1 − )(1 −  + ( − t−1)(1 − rt−1))F
VT−1 = (1 − 𝛿)ŵ(ẽT ) + 𝛿(rTŵ(ẽT ) + (1 − rT )5)
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– With probability 1 −  , his incumbent employer will be in the labor mar-
ket but hiring someone else, exposing his shirking. He will earn only the 
unemployment pay of 5.
Therefore the expected future payoff for workers for not shirking in period T − 1 is: 
Plugging VT−1 and V
�
T−1
 into c(ẽt) ≤ Vt − V
�
t
 and simplifying, we find that to get non-
minimal effort from selfish workers at period T − 1 , an offer has to satisfy: 
For p = 0.55 , working backwards from ẽT = 2 , an effort level of ̃eT−1 = 4 is sus-
tainable for  = 0.1 , while  = 0.5 can only sustain an effort level of ̃eT−1 = 3.
• Step 3: (behavior of selfish workers at t < T)
 To compute Vt more generally, let’s first define for the selfish type the future 
payoff of getting an offer at period t, ut , and the corresponding payoff for not 
getting an offer u′
t
 : 
A worker that does not shirk will get an offer at t + 1 if the employer is operation. If 
the employer is shut down (with probability  ), with rt the worker switch employers 
and with probability 1 − rt the worker remain unemployed but still connected to the 
incumbent employer. 
Similarly, a worker that shirks will cover up his shirking if his employer is shut 
down the next period. If the employer is not shut down, he will get unemployment 
and be disconnected from this employer. 
Equilibrium offer that keeps selfish types from shirking must satisfy c(ẽt) ≤ Vt − V
�
t
 . If 
no c(ẽt) satisfy this condition, the employer’s best choice is to treat the game as a series 
of one-shot games. Substituting ̃eT−1 from Step 2 into the equations above for  = 0.1 





= (1 − 𝛿)5 + 𝛿(rTŵ(ẽT ) + (1 − rT )5)
c( ̃eT−1) ≤ (1 − 𝛿)(ŵ(ẽT ) − 5)
ut =
{
ŵ(ẽT ) if t = T






5 if t = T








= rt+1ut+1 + (1 − rt+1)u
�
t+1
+ (1 − )u
�
t+1
 S. Linardi, C. Camerer 
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